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ARGUMENT
THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF § 35-1-70 AND 35-1-68 PROVIDES
FOR THE EMPLOYERS' REINSURANCE FUND TO PAY
DEATH BENEFITS AFTER THE FIRST SIX YEARS.
The Utah appellate courts have repeatedly declared that when "[fjaced with a question
of statutory construction, [the court will] first examine the plain language of the statute."
Olsen v. Samuel Mclntyre Investment Co.. 956 P.2d 257, 259 (Utah 1998); accord Stephens
v.Bonneville Travel. Inc.. 935 P.2d 518, 520 (Utah 1997); V-1 Oil Company v. Utah State
Tax Comm'n. 942 P.2d 906, 916 (Utah 1997). This Court has explained that '"[w]here
statutory language is plain and unambiguous, this Court will not look beyond the same to
divine legislative intent.'" State ex rel A.B.. 936 P.2d 1091, 1097 (Utah 1997) (quoting
Brinkerhoff v. Forsyth. 779 P.2d 685, 686 (Utah 1989) (emphasis added)). As the Utah
Supreme Court explained, "The reason for such a rule is clear. It prevents judges from
'finding' an ambiguity . . . in an attempt to justify an interpretation they prefer." Salt Lake
Citv v. Ohms, the 881 P.2d 844, 850 n.14 (Utah 1994). Furthermore, as the court noted in
State ex rel A.B.: "to interpret statutes by reference to legislative debates actually erodes [the]
due process notice function of [the] statute." 936 P.2d at 1097 (citing 2A Norman J. Singer,
Sutherland Statutory Construction § 45.08, at 35 (5th Ed. 1992)). When the statute on its face
is clear, the court will not '"delve into the uncertain facts of legislative history."' ]sL (quoting
Visitor Info. Or. Auth. V. Customer Ser. Div. Utah State Tax Comm'n. 930 P.2d 1196,
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1198 (Utah 1997)): accord Salt Lake Child & Family Therapy Clinic. Inc. v. Frederick. 890
P.2d 1017, 1020 (Utah 1995) ("'When language is clear and unambiguous, it must be held to
mean what it expresses, and no room is left for construction.'" (citations omitted)); S££ also
Stephens v. Bonneville Travel. Inc.. 935 P.2d 518 (Utah 1997) (where statutory language is
plan and unambiguous, the court will refuse to consider "or otherwise attempt to assess the
wisdom of the legislation."); State v. Valdez. 933 P.2d 400 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (stating
"only if the plain language of the statute is unclear do we 'resort to legislative history and
purpose for guidance.'" (citation omitted)).
The language of Section 35-1-70, is clear and unambiguous. The section reads as
follows:
If any wholly dependent persons, who have been receiving the
benefits of this title, at the termination of such benefits are yet in
a dependent condition, and under all reasonable circumstances
should be entitled to additional benefits, the Industrial
Commission may, in its discretion, extend indefinitely such
benefits; but the liability of the employer or insurance carrier
involved shall not be extended, and the additional benefits
allowed shall be paid out of the special fund provided for in
subdivision (1) of §35-1-68.
(Emphasis added).
The statute clearly and unambiguously states that the liability of the employer or
insurance carrier shall not be extended beyond 312 weeks. The statute further clearly and
unambiguously states that the additional benefits shall be paid out of the special fund provided
for in subdivision (1) of § 35-1-68. Section 35-1-68 clearly and unambiguously states that the
Employers' Reinsurance Fund is created "for the purpose of making payments in accordance
with Chapters 1 and 2, Title 35" and that "[w]henever [the] code refers to the 'Special Fund,' .
2

. . that reference is considered to be the Employers' Reinsurance Fund."1
Respondents would have this Court find an ambiguity in the statute in order to look to
the legislative history. This is unnecessary and contrary to the rules of statutory construction.
Rather, the Court need look no further than the specific language of the statute. The specific
language of Subdivision (1) of Section 35-1-68 provides that the Employers1 Reinsurance Fund
was created "for the purpose of making payments in accordance with Chapters 1 and 2, Title
35." Read with Section 70, which expressly designates that the liability for additional benefits
(those benefits beyond the first 312 weeks) "shall be paid out of the special fund provided for
in Subdivision (1) of Section 35-1-68," the statutory intend is clear and unambiguous.
Nevertheless, the Employers Reinsurance Fund argues that the statute should be interpreted to
impose no liability whatsoever. This interpretation is starkly contrary to the express language
of the statute.
Furthermore, the express language of Sections 68 and 70 provides only for six years or
312 weeks of liability for death benefits to the employer or its insurance carrier. Specifically,
Section 68 states that the employer or its insurance carrier will pay compensation "during
dependency for the remainder of the period between the date of the death and the expiration of
six years or 312 weeks after the date of the injury." Utah Code Ann. § 35-l-68(2)(a)(i)
(1988). There is no express provision for liability beyond this period. Rather, Section 70
expressly provides that "the liability of the employer or insurance carrier shall not be
extended." Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-70 (1988).

l

A complete copy of Section 35-1-68 (1987) is attached hereto as Exhibit "1
3

Respondents argue that a 1979 amendment to Section 35-1-68 eliminated any liability
for the Employers' Reinsurance Fund to pay death benefits. As outlined in Petitioners'
original brief, a plain reading of the statute does not reflect this asserted change. Rather, the
shift in liability from the Employers Reinsurance Fund to the employer and/or its insurance
carrier was not accomplished until 1994. The 1994 amendment modified Subdivision (1) of
Section 35-1-68 to read as follows:
(1) There is created an Employers' Reinsurance Fund for the
purpose of making payments for industrial accidents or
occupational disease occurring on or before June 30. 1994. The
Employers' Reinsurance Fund shall have no liability for industrial
accidents or occupational disease occurring on or after July 1.
1994. This fund shall succeed to all monies previously held in
the "Special Fund," the "Combined Injury Fund," or the "Second
Injury Fund." Whenever this code refers to the "Special Fund,"
the "Combined Injury Fund," or the "Second Injury Fund" that
reference is considered to be the Employers' Reinsurance Fund.
The state treasurer shall be the custodian of the Employers'
Reinsurance Fund, and the commission shall make provisions for
and direct its distribution. Reasonable costs of administration or
other fees may be paid from the fund.
(Emphasis added) (A full copy of Utah Code § 35-1-68 (1994) is attached hereto as Exhibit

If, as Respondents assert, the Employers' Reinsurance Fund was relieved of all liability
with the 1979 amendment, why does the 1994 statute expressly state that (1) the Employers'
Reinsurance Fund is created for "the purpose of making payments" for industrial injuries "on
or before June 301994"\ and (2) the Employers' Reinsurance Fund shall have no liability for
industrial injuries occurring "on or after July 1, 1994." If the Legislature had intended the
1994 amendment merely as a clarification of the 1979 amendment, the Legislature would not
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have expressly chosen June 30, 1994 as the date when the Employers' Reinsurance Fund's
liability for death benefits terminated.2
The 1994 amendment made other significant changes to Section 68 which demonstrate
that it was not until after June 30, 1994, that the employer and/or its insurance carrier was
liable for death benefits beyond the initial 312 week period. First, the 1994 amendment to
Section 68 added specific language requiring employers or carriers to pay death benefits to
wholly dependent persons after the expiration of the first 312 week period. See Utah Code
Ann. § 35-l-68(5)(a)(ii) (1994).
Second, the 1994 amendment to Section 68 deleted the provision which required an
employer or carrier to pay to the Employers' Reinsurance Fund the difference between the
amounts paid to wholly or partly dependent persons and $30,000. See Utah Code Ann. § 35l-68(2)(d) (1988) in comparison with Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-68 (1994). As explained in
Petitioner's original brief, it makes little sense to have an employer or carrier pay benefits to
the Employers' Reinsurance Fund for death cases if the Employers' Reinsurance Fund has no
liability whatsoever for death benefits. Rather, the logical assumption under the language of
1988 version of Section 68 is that the employer/carrier which pays less than $30,000 in a death
case (a relatively small amount) should be required to pay the difference to the Employers'
Reinsurance Fund to help fund the Employers' Reinsurance Fund when it has to pay death
benefits. The 1994 amendment deleted this provision of Section 68 since the Employers'
2

While the Employers' Reinsurance Fund was also relieved of liability for permanent total
disability claims in 1994, Section 68 specifically deals with death benefits The Legislature shifted
liability for permanent total disability benefits from the Employers' Reinsurance Fund to the
employer and/or its insurance carrier through amendments to Section 35-1-67 of the Act.
5

Reinsurance Fund was expressly relieved of liability for death benefits after July 1, 1994.

CONCLUSION
The statutory provisions of the Workers Compensation Act in effect at the time of Mr.
Moore's injury and death, Section 35-1-68 and 35-1-70 (1988), are clear and unambiguous on
their face. Accordingly, this Court need not look beyond the plain language of the statute to
divine legislative intent from the asserted legislative history. The plain and unambiguous
language of the statute provides that an employer or carrier must pay death benefits for up to 312
weeks after the date of injury, with the Employers' Reinsurance Fund making payments thereafter.
This Court has already examined this issue in Hales v Industrial Commission,findingthat there is
a continuation of death benefits by the "fund" under Section 68. Accordingly, this Court should
follow the plain language of Sections 68 and 70 and award benefits to Ms. Moorefromthe
Employers' Reinsurance Fund. Further, Petitioners Stouffers Food Corporation and Liberty
Mutual Insurance Co. should be awarded reimbursementfromthe Employers' Reinsurance Fund
for all benefits paid to Ms. Moore beyond the initial 312 week period.
Respectfully submitted this^f^day of October, 1998.
BLACKBURN & STOLL, LC

Michael E. Dyer
Dori K. Petersen
Attorneys for Petitioners
Stouffer Food Corporation and/or
Liberty Mutual Insurance Co.
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The division of vocational rehabilitation shall, at the.
termination of the vocational training of the e m p p
oyee, certify to the industrial commission of Utah
the work the employee is qualified to perform, aad\
thereupon the commission shall, after notice to the
employer and an opportunity to be heard, determine
whether the employee has, notwithstanding such
rehabilitation, sustained a loss of bodily function.
...
The loss or permanent and complete loss of use of,
both hands or both arms, or both feet or both legs »
or both eyes, or of any two thereof, constitutes total
and permanent disability, to be compensated acco-^
rding to the provisions of this section and no tent*
ative finding of permanent total disability is required in those instances. In all other cases where there,
has been rehabilitation effected but where there it
some loss of bodily function, the award shall be?
based upon partial permanent disability.
In n o case shall the employer or the insurance
carrier be required to pay compensation for any
combination of disabilities of any kind as provided
in Sections 35-1-65, 35-1-66 and this section;
including loss of function, in excess of 85% o f the
state average weekly wage at the time of the injury
per week for 312 weeks.
ists
35-1-68. Second Injun Fund - Injury causing
death - Burial expenses - Payments to
dependents.
(1) There is created a Second Injury Fund for the
purpose of making payments in accordance with
Chapters 1 and 2. This fund shall succeed to all
monies heretofore held in that fund designated as
the "Special Fund" or the "Combined Injury Fund"
and whenever reference is made elsewhere in this
code to the "Special Fund" or the "Combined Injury
Fund" that reference shall be deemed to be to the
Second Injury Fund. The state treasurer shall be the
custodian of the Second Injury Fund and the commission shall direct its distribution. Reasonable
administration assistance may be paid from the
proceeds of that fund. The attorney general shall
appoint a member of his staff to represent the
Second Injury Fund in all proceedings brought to
enforce claims against it.
(2) If injury causes death within the period o f six
years from the date of the accident, the employer or
insurance earner shall pay the burial expenses o f the
deceased as provided in Section 35-1-81, and
further benefits in the amounts and to the persons
as follows:
(a)(i) If there are wholly dependent persons at
the time of the death, the payment by the employer
or insurance carrier shall be 6 6 - 2 / 3 % o f the
decedent's average weekly wage at the time o f the
injury, but not more than a maximum of 8 5 % of
the state average weekly wage at the time o f the
injury per week and not less than a minimum o f $45
per week plus $5 for a dependent spouse and $5 for
each dependent minor child under the age o f 18
years, up to a maximum of four such dependent
minor children not to exceed the average weekly
wage of the employee at the time of the injury, but
not to exceed 85% of the state average weekly wage
at the time of the injury per week, to continue
during dependency for the remainder of the period
between the date of the death and not to exceed six
years or 312 weeks after the date of the injury.
(ii) The weekly payment to wholly dependent
persons during dependency following the expiration
of the first six-year period described in Subsection
(2)(a)(i) shall be an amount equal to the weekly
benefits paid to those wholly dependent persons

Annotations, consult C O D E « C O ' S Annotation Service
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interests with respect to reexamination of the permanent
total disability finding, except if the employee does not
prevail, the attorneys fees shall be set at $1000. The
attorneys fees shall be paid by the employer or its insurance carrier in addition to the permanent total disability
compensation benefits due.
(h) During the period of reexamination or adjudication
if the employee fully cooperates, each insurer, self-insured
employer, or the Employers' Reinsurance Fund shall continue to pay t h e permanent total disability compensation
benefits due the employee.
(12) If any provision of this section, or the application of any
provision to any person or circumstance, is held invalid, the
remainder of this section shall be given effect without the
invalid provision or application.
1996
35-1-68. Employers' Reinsurance Fund — Injury canshog death — Burial expenses — Payments to
dependents.
(1) There is created an Employers' Reinsurance Fund for
the purpose of making payments for industrial accidents or
occupational diseases occurring on or before June 30, 1994.
The payments shall be made in accordance with Title 35,
Chapters 1 and 2. The Employers' Reinsurance Fund shall
have no liability for industrial accidents or occupational
diseases occurring on or after July 1, 1994. This fund shall
succeed to all monies previously held in the "Special Fund,"
the "Combined Injury Fund,* or the "Second Injury Fund."
Whenever this code refers to the "Special Fund," the "Combined Injury Fund," or t h e "Second Injury Fund" that reference is considered to be the Employers' Reinsurance Fund.
The state treasurer shall be the custodian of the Employers'
Reinsurance Fund, and the commission shall make provisions
for and direct its distribution. Reasonable costs of administration or other fees m a y be paid from the fund.
(2) The state treasurer shall:
(a) receive workers' compensation premium assessments from the State Tax Commission; and
(b) invest the Employers' Reinsurance Fund to ensure
maximum investment return for both long and short term
investments in accordance with Section 51-7-12.5.
(3) The commission may employ or retain counsel to represent the Employers' Reinsurance Fund in proceedings brought
to enforce claims against or on behalf of the fund. Upon
request of the commission, the attorney general shall aid in
representation of the fund.
(4) The liability of t h e state, its departments, agencies,
instrumentalities, elected or appointed officials, or other duly
authorized agents, with respect to payment of any compensation benefits, expenses, fees, medical expenses, or disbursement properly chargeable against the Employers'Reinsurance
Fund, is limited to t h e cash or assets in the Employers'
Reinsurance Fund, a n d they are not otherwise, in any way,
liable for the operation, debts, or obligations of the Employers'
Reinsurance Fund.
(5) If injury causes death within a period of 312 weeks from
the date of the accident, the employer or insurance carrier
shall pay the burial expenses of the deceased as provided in
Section 35-1-81, and further benefits in the amounts and to
the persons as follows:
(a) (i) If there a r e wholly dependent persons at the
time of the death, the payment by the employer or its
insurance carrier shall be 66WX> of the decedent's
average weekly wage a t the time of the injury, but not
more than a TrurHmnm of 85% of the state average
weekly wage a t the time of the injury per week and
not less t h a n a minimum of $45 per week, plus $5 for
a dependent spouse, plus $5 for each dependent
minor child under the age of 18 years, up to a
maximum of four such dependent minor children, but
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not exceeding the average weekly wage of the employee at the time of the injury, and not exceeding
85% of the state average weekly wage at the time of
the injury per week. Compensation shall continue
during dependency for the remainder of the period
between the date of the death and the expiration of
312 weeks after the date of the injury.
(ii) The payment by the employer or its insurance
carrier to wholly dependent persons during dependency following the expiration of the first 312-week
period described in Subsection (5XaXi) shall be an
amount equal to the weekly benefits paid to those
wholly dependent persons during that initial 312week period, reduced by 50% of any weekly federal
Social Security death benefits paid to those wholly
dependent persons.
(iii) The issue of dependency shall be subject to
review by the commission at the end of the initial
312-week pericd and annually thereafter. If in any
such review it is determined that, under the facts and
circumstances existing at that time, the applicant is
no longer a wholly dependent person, the applicant
may be considered a partly dependent or
nondependent person and shall be paid such benefits
as the commission may determine under Subsection
(5)(bXii).
(iv) For purposes of any dependency determination, a surviving spouse of a deceased employee shall
be conclusively presumed to be wholly dependent for
a 312-week period from the date of death of the
employee. This presumption shall not apply after the
initial 312-week period and, in determining the then
existing annual income of the surviving spouse, the
commission shall exclude 50% of any federal Social
Security death benefits received by that surviving
spouse.
(b) (i) If there are partly dependent persons at the time
of the death, the payment shall be 66Ts% of the
decedent's average weekly wage at the time of the
injury, but not more than a maximum of 85% of the
state average weekly wage at the time of the injury
per week and not less than a minimum of $45 per
week. Compensation shall continue during dependency for the remainder of the period between the
date of death and the expiration of 312 weeks after
the date of injury as the commission in each case may
determine. Compensation may not amount to more
than a m ^ m n m of $30,000. The benefits provided
for in this subsection shall be in keeping with the
circumstances and conditions of dependency existing
at the date of injury, and any amount awarded by the
commission under this subsection shall be consistent
with the general provisions of this title.
(ii) Benefits to persons determined to be partly
dependent under Subsection (5XaXiii) shall be determined by the commission in keeping with the circumstances and conditions of dependency existing at the
time of the dependency review and may be paid in an
amount not exceeding the mfl-ri-mmn weekly rate that
partly dependent persons would receive if wholly
dependent
(iii) Payments under this section shall be paid to
such persons during their dependency by the employer or its insurance carrier.
(c) If there are wholly dependent persons and also
partly dependent persons a t the time of death, the commission may apportion the benefits as it considers just
and equitable; provided, that the total benefits awarded to
all parties concerned do not exceed the maximum provided for by law.
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